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Abstract
Currently we are witnessing a rapid integration of social networks and cloud
computing, especially on storing social media contents on cloud storage due to its
cheap management and easy accessing at any time and from any place. However,
how to securely store and share social media contents such as pictures/videos
among social groups is still a very challenging problem. In this paper, we try to
tackle this problem by using a new cryptographic primitive: the identity based
proxy re-encryption plus (IBPRE+), which is a variant of proxy re-encryption
(PRE). In PRE, by using re-encryption keys, a ciphertext computed for Alice
can be transferred into a new one for Bob by a proxy. Recently, the concept
of PRE plus (PRE+) was introduced by Wang et al. In PRE+, except the re-
encryption keys are generated by the encrypter instead of the delegator, while
other algorithms are almost the same as traditional PRE. The message-level
based fine-grained delegation property and the weak non-transferable property
can be easily achieved by PRE+, while traditional PRE cannot achieve them.
In this paper, the concept of PRE+ is further extended to the identity based
setting. Based on the 3-linear map, we first propose a new IBE scheme and
a new IBPRE+ scheme, we prove the security of these schemes and give the
properties and performance analysis of the new IBPRE+ scheme. Finally, we
propose a new framework based on this new primitive for secure cloud social
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data sharing.
Keywords: Secure social cloud data sharing, Identity based encryption, Proxy
re-encryption plus, Identity based proxy re-encryption plus, 3-linear map
1. Introduction
1.1. Social Network and Cloud Storage
Currently social networks have become commonplace in our daily life. Face-
book, Twitter, Tenent etc. are huge companies focusing on social networks and
their productions like QQ, Wechat, MSN for sharing photos and videos are used
widely by large communities of users. Social networks can be seen as the map
from real life community to the information network. Social groups as a typi-
cal feature in our social life, such as social groups of families, social groups of
friends, social groups of interest, social group of workmates etc., is inherited by
social networks. By connecting users and groups of users, social networks have
become very huge and complex in managing the global community. Indeed,
it is not easy to analyse the behaviour of this complex social community for
information sharing.
Along with the rapid growth of social networks, very huge massive data sets
are being generated instantly every day. For example, the Tencent company
needs to store almost 5,000 billion instant messages created by the QQ users
every day, and this data set increases 10% every month. The amount of these
data sets can be as large as several TB/PBs every day. Thus, it is very natural
to leverage cloud storage techniques to smoothly running these social networks.
However, before using advanced cloud storage techniques, the user’s concern on
security should be taken into account. Actually there are incidents on leaking
user’s privacy from social cloud storage (various examples are being reported
often by the press media, such as the well known case of Jennifer Lawrence’s
photos). Such incidents indicate that effective secure storing and sharing social
data contents are very challenging problems. In this paper, aiming at tackling
the user’s data protection problems in social networks, we propose a framework
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for a controlled secure social data sharing based on a new primitive named
Identity Based Proxy Re-encryption plus (IBPRE+), which is a variant of proxy
re-encryption technique.
1.2. Traditional IBPRE for Secure Social Cloud Storage Sharing
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was proposed by Blaze, Bleumer
and Strauss [3] in 1998. In PRE, a ciphertext for Alice can be transformed
into another ciphertext for Bob by a semi-trusted proxy. Furthermore anything
about the underlying plaintext cannot be learned by the proxy. PRE schemes
can be categorized as bidirectional and unidirectional according to the direction
of transformation. By using the re-encryption key, if the proxy can transform
ciphertexts from Alice to Bob and vice-versa, this kind of PRE scheme is called
bidirectional. If the proxy can only transform ciphertext in one direction, this
kind of PRE scheme is called unidirectional. If the ciphertext can be transformed
from A to B and to C and so on, Blaze et al. [3] defined this kind of PRE scheme
as multi-use one; if the ciphertext can be transformed only once, the PRE scheme
is called as single-use one.
PRE has many applications, such as key escrow [24], distributed file sys-
tems [1, 2], simplification of key distribution [3], anonymous communication [10],
multicast [9], cloud storage system [22, 41–43], and cloud computation [23, 25].
Recently, the research on cloud social data storage system is becoming more and
more popular, which allows an enterprise to rent the cloud SaaS service to build
a cheap and manageable storage system. It is much cheaper and scalable than
traditional self-management solutions [26, 28–30]. Especially, Gai et al. have
made lots of contribution on the hot topic of social media cloud storage, attack
strategy combining spoofing and jamming, secure data transmission method
for intelligent transportation system, fully homomorphic encryption [16–19, 21].
Attribute based encryption also has very important application to secure cloud
storage. Yu et al. have contributed many interesting results in this area [45][44],
however attribute based encryption (ABE) is different from proxy re-encryption
(PRE) although they have the same property of fine-grained delegation on the
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decryption capability. ABE runs more like a one-to-many encryption paradigm,
while one encrypter can communicate with different decryptors. Only the de-
cryptors satisfy the access control formulae, the communication can be success-
ful. PRE runs more like a one-to-one paradigm, the delegator shares his content
to the delegatee. The advantage of PRE is that, the delegator and the delegatee
do not need to change their own normal encryption algorithm, while PRE still
has the ability of ciphertext transformation.
Identity based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) is a kind of PRE scheme used
in the identity based setting where the identity can be seen as the public key. In
this paper, we focus on the cryptographic primitive of identity based proxy re-
encryption. Fig. 1 represents the traditional identity based proxy re-encryption.
Until now the generation of re-encryption key is generally determined by the
delegator for almost all of the traditional IBPRE schemes. Concretely, the re-
encryption key is generated by the delegator A in unidirectional IBPRE; and









































Figure 1: Traditional identity based proxy re-encryption scheme.
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1.3. The Dilemma When Using Traditional IBPRE for Secure Social Cloud
Data Sharing
When using traditional IBPRE for secure social cloud data sharing, there
exists a dilemma which cannot be avoided. As Fig. 2 shows, data owner Alice
first encrypts her private photos A/B and then outsources them to the cloud.
Later, she want to share only the photo A with friend Bob by using traditional
identity based proxy re-encryption. In this case, the cloud can transform the
encrypted photos to be one encrypted with Bob’s identity, and Bob can decrypt
them to get Alice’s photos. But the problem is that the cloud can implement
the transformation on both photo A and photo B, while Alice only want to share
photo A with Bob! This is due to the traditional IBPRE [11] only has the all-
or-nothing transformation ability, although conditional IBPRE [23] can solve
this problem partially, it cannot achieve the message-level based fine-grained
delegation ability. In conditional or type based PRE [12–15], ciphertexts and
re-encryption keys are associated with conditions, if and only if the delegator’s
ciphertexts satisfied with the conditions, these ciphertexts can be re-encrypted.
Furthermore, the conditional re-encryption key inherits the all-or-nothing trans-
formation ability from traditional re-encryption key. Here we give an example
to demonstrate the situation.
Let us consider another scenario:
Suppose Alice has two group of videos, one group labelled with “fam-
ily” and the other group labelled with “work” and she wants to share
some videos to others. By delegating the cloud server conditional
proxy re-encryption key with “family” or with “work”, the cloud
server can transform encrypted group of videos labelled with “fam-
ily” from Alice to her husband, or it can transform encrypted group
of videos labelled with “work” from Alice to her colleague. But note
that the cloud server has the ability of implementing this transforma-
tion for the whole group of encrypted video, while sometimes Alice
does not want to do so. Furthermore, the encryption of videos also
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needs to take “family” or “work” as the conditional input, which is
not convenient to Alice.
Figure 2: Data owner Alice cannot control which photo is shared with the delegatee.
1.4. New Primitive IBPRE+ and Its Advantages
So how to avoid this dilemma? We use the new concept of proxy re-
encryption plus (PRE+) recently proposed by Wang et al. [32, 39]. In their
scheme, the key is generated by the sender S. Concretely, the proxy re-encryption
key is generated by using the randomness used in the encryption process. In
this way the delegation granting process can be completely controlled by the
sender S. Fig. 3 describes the idea of this new primitive.
In traditional identity based proxy re-encryption system, the re-encryption
key is generated by A or A with B. So, A can decide whether to let B share the
message sent by S, and B can let other users share the message further. But
there is a concern in this process, namely, if A gives the data sharing capability
to B and a proxy P , B can collude with P to get all the messages that S sends
to A. Furthermore, B can grant the data sharing capability to the others. If so,
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the sender S cannot control which message to be learned by which person. To
solve this problem, many condition-based proxy re-encryption schemes [33] were
proposed, which aims to achieve a fine-grained delegation. But these schemes
cannot overcome the shortcoming thoroughly. In this paper, we propose a new
IBPRE+ system. In our proposal, the people who can share the content of the













































Figure 3: Identity based proxy re-encryption plus.
1.5. Our Contribution
In this paper, based on PRE+ [39] and 3-linear map (3-linear map is a
concrete instantiation of the recently proposed cryptographic primitive multi-
linear map, which has been used in [34]), we propose a new IBPRE+ scheme
and analyse the proposal’s security and property. To easily understand our
IBPRE+ scheme, the IBE scheme proposed by Boneh and Boyen [5] is first
reviewed. Then, based on 3-linear map, we construct a new IBE scheme and a
new IBE scheme with fixed randomness. Our IBPRE+ scheme is constructed
following these schemes. All these schemes have been proved secure by standard
cryptographic techniques. Finally, we show how to use IBPRE+ scheme to
achieve flexible and secure social cloud data sharing. This paper is an extension
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of [40] but with significant extension, concretely we give the detailed definition
and security model of IBE and IBPRE+, formally prove the security of the new
IBE scheme and new IBPRE+ scheme, give the properties and performance
analysis of our IBPRE+ proposal, compare it with other related work, etc.
1.6. Organization
We give the definition and security model for IBE and IBPRE in section 2,
we also give some mathematical tools and assumptions which are necessary to
understand our work in this section. In section 3, we first review the BB1
IBE scheme; secondly we propose a new IBE scheme and another new IBE
scheme with fixed randomness based on 3-linear map; then we give our IBPRE+
proposal. In section 4, we prove the security of these schemes. In section 5,
we give the properties and performance analysis of our IBPRE+ scheme. In
section 6 we demonstrate the application of our scheme in secure social cloud
data sharing. In the last section 7, we conclude our paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Definition and Security Model
2.1.1. Definition for IBE
We first recall the definition of IBE, which can be found in [4]:
1. Setup(1k). This algorithm takes a security parameter as input, it outputs
the private master key msk and the public parameters params.
2. KeyGen(msk, params, ID). This algorithm takes the master secret key
msk and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, it outputs the private key
skID .
3. Encrypt(ID, params, m). This algorithm takes an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗,
a set of public parameters and a plaintext m ∈M as input, it outputs the
ciphertext CID.
4. Decrypt(skID, params, CID). This algorithm takes the ciphertext CID,
params, and the secret key skID as input, it outputs m or ⊥.
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2.1.2. Security Model for IBE
We recall the IND-sID-CPA security in [5, 6], it is defined by using the fol-
lowing game:
1. Init: The adversary selects the target identity ID∗ which it wishes to be
challenged.
2. Setup: The Setup algorithm is run by the challenger. The resulting
system parameters params are given to the adversary and the master key
is kept by itself.
3. Phase1: q1 · · · qm are issued by the adversary where qi is one of private key
queries on IDi (IDi 6= ID∗). By running algorithm KeyGen, the private
key di is generated and responded to the adversary by the challenger.
Note here each query qi may depend on the replies to q1, · · · , qi−1, these
queries maybe asked adaptively.
4. Challenge: The adversary outputs two equal length plaintexts M0,M1 ∈
M, once it decides that Phase1 is over, on which it wishes to be challenged.
The challenger sets the challenge ciphertext to be C = Encryption(params, ID∗,Mb)
where b ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the adversary.
5. Phase2: Additional queries qm+1 · · · qn are issued by the adversary where
qi is one of private key queries on IDi (IDi 6= ID∗). The challenger just
handles as in Phase1. Note these queries maybe asked adaptively as in
Phase1.
6. Guess: Finally, a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} is outputted by the adversary. The
adversary wins if b = b′.
Such an adversary A refer to as an IND-sID-CPA adversary. The advantage of
the adversary A in attacking the scheme E is




The probability is over the random bits used by the adversary and the chal-
lenger. We say scheme E is IND-sID-CPA secure if this probability is negligible.
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2.1.3. Definition for IBPRE+
Based on the definition of PRE+ [32, 39], we give our definition of IBPRE+:
1. Setup(1k). This algorithm is given a security parameter as input, it
outputs both the master public parameters params and the master key
msk, while the former are distributed to users, and the latter is kept
private.
2. KeyGen(params, msk, ID). This algorithm is given an identity ID ∈
{0, 1}∗ and the master secret key msk as input, it outputs that identity’s
decryption key skID.
3. Encrypt(params, ID, r, r′, m). This algorithm is given a set of public
parameters, an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, a fixed ephemeral randomness r
and a plaintext m ∈M as input, it outputs a second level ciphertext CID.
Note this ciphertext can be probabilistic generated by using other non-
fixed ephemeral randomness r′, and it can be further re-encrypted by the
proxy.
4. ReKeyGen(params, r, ID1, ID2). This algorithm is given the fixed
ephemeral randomness r for ID1, and identity ID2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input,
the encrypter non-interactively generates the re-encryption key rkID1→ID2
and outputs it.
5. Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2 , CID1). This algorithm is given a sec-
ond level ciphertext CID1 under identity ID1, and a re-encryption key
rkID1→ID2 as input, it outputs a first level re-encrypted ciphertext CID2 .
6. Decrypt2(params, skID, CID). This algorithm is given a second level
ciphertext CID under identity ID with secret key skID as input, it de-
crypts the ciphertext CID and outputs m or ⊥.
7. Decrypt1(params, skID, CID). This algorithm is given a first level
re-encrypted ciphertext CID under identity ID with secret key skID as
input, it decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext CID and outputs m or ⊥.
Correctness: If the expected decryption of a properly generated cipher-
tex is always outputted by the Decrypt algorithm, we call the IBPRE+ scheme
10
correct.
Formally, if cID1 ← Encrypt(params, ID1, r,m) then ∀m ∈M,∀ID1, ID2 ∈
{0, 1}∗, where skID1 = KeyGen(msk, ID1), skID2 = KeyGen(msk, ID2), rkID1→ID2 ←
ReKeyGen(param,
r, ID1, ID2) the following always holds:
• Decrypt(params, skID1 , cID1) = m
• Decrypt(params, skID2 , Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2 , cID1)) = m
Remark 1. In the Encrypt algorithm, fixed ephemeral randomness r is critical
for the re-encryption key generation. r can be reused for encryption of different
plaintexts. In some cases, other non-fixed ephemeral randomness r′ can be used
for encryption, but this r′ can not be reused for encryption of different plaintexts.
The encryptor can achieve message-level fine-grained delegation and the weak
non-transferable property.
2.1.4. IND-sID-CPA Security for Second Level Ciphertext of IBPRE+
IND-sID-CPA security for the second level ciphertext is defined as following:
1. Setup. The challenger runs Setup(1k) and gets (params,msk), sends
params to A. Here we define extract oracle Oextract as the key gener-
ation oracle, Orkextract as the re-encryption key extract oracle, Oreencrypt
as the re-encrypt oracle.
2. Find phase. The following queries are made by A. At the beginning of
this phase A will select ID∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ as the target identity, it also selects
randomly (m0,m1) ∈M2.
(a) For A’s queries to extract oracle Oextract with (extract, ID), return
skID = KeyGen(params,msk, ID) to A.
(b) For A’s queries to re-encryption key extract oracle Orkextract with
(rkextract, ID1, ID2), where ID1 6= ID2, return rkID1→ID2 = ReKeygen
(params, r, ID2) which is indistinguishable with the real correct re-
encryption key to A, where r is a randomly chosen randomess for
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encryption. Note here only the encrypter can generate the correct
re-encryption key, and any other can not generate this, thus the oracle
returns a simulated indistinguishable re-encryption key for A. And
this does not help A to distinguish the simulated environment from
the real environment, for in the real environment the re-encryption
with incorrect re-encrypt key also cause the delegatee’s unsuccessful
decrypt.
(c) For A’s queries to re-encrypt oracle Oreencrypt with (reencrypt, ID1,
ID2, C), derive a re-encryption key rkID1→ID2 as above, and return
C ′ = Reencrypt(params, rkID1→ID2 , ID1, ID2, C) to A.
Note that ID∗ such that trivial decryption is possible using keys extracted
during this phase is not permitted by A to choose (e.g. translate from ID∗
to some identity for which A holds a decryption key by using extracted
re-encryption keys).
3. Choice and Challenge. When (choice, ID∗,m0,m1) is presented by A, the
challenger chooses i←R {0, 1}, computes C∗ = Encrypt(params, ID∗,mi)
and gives C∗ to A.
4. Guess stage. As in the find stage A continues to make queries. Let C
= (C∗, ID∗). Let C′ be the set of all possible values derived via calls to
Reencrypt oracle, for all rk given to A, e.g. on successful execution of re-
encrypt query (reencrypt, ID∗, ID′, C∗), let C ′ be the result and add the
pair (C ′, ID′) to the set C′. Derivative of (C∗, ID∗) is defined as C ∪ C′) .
(a) any queries (extract, ID) to extract oracleOextract or (rkextract, ID1, ID2)
to re-encryption key extract oracle Orkextract that would permit triv-
ial decryption of any ciphertext in (C,C ′) is not permitted to be
issued by A.
(b) any query of the form (reencrypt, ID1, ID2, C) to re-encrypt oracle
Oreencrypt where A possesses the keys to trivially decrypt ciphertexts
under ID2 and (C, ID1) ∈ (C ∩ C′) is not not permitted to be issued
by A.
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At the conclusion of this stage, A outputs i′, where i′ ∈ {0, 1}.
If i′ = i then A wins the game. Let AdvA =| Pr(i′ = i)− 1/2 |. we say that
the IBPRE+ scheme S is IND-sID-CPA secure for the second level ciphertext, if
for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A, AdvA is negligible.
2.1.5. IND-sID-CPA Security for First Level Ciphertext of IBPRE+
IND-sID-CPA Security for the first level ciphertext is defined as the following:
1. Setup. The challenger runs Setup(1k) and gets (params,msk), sends
params to A. Here we define extract oracle Oextract as the key gener-
ation oracle, Orkextract as the re-encryption key extract oracle, Oreencrypt
as the re-encrypt oracle.
2. Find phase. The following queries are made by A. At the beginning of this
phase (ID?, ID∗) ∈ {0, 1}∗ as the target identity pair will be selected by
A, it also selects randomly (m0,m1) ∈M2.
(a) Return skID =KeyGen(params,msk, ID) to A, for A’s queries to ex-
tract oracle Oextract with (extract, ID).
(b) This oracle handles as the above game 2.1.4, for A’s queries to re-
encryption key extract oracle Orkextract with (rkextract, ID1, ID2).
Note here that all the extracted re-encryption keys including ID∗ to some
identity for which A holds a decryption key is permitted to be given to
A. Also note here that the re-encrypt oracle is useless, he can do all the
re-encryption and transform the second level ciphertext to the first level
ciphertext since A knows all the re-encryption key.
3. Choice and Challenge. When (choice, ID?, ID∗,m0,m1) is presented by
A, choose i ←R {0, 1}, compute C? = Encrypt(params, ID∗,mi) and
C∗ = Reencrypt
(params, rkID∗→ID? , ID
?, ID∗, C?) give C? to A.
4. Guess stage. A continues to make queries as in the find stage, with the
following restrictions.
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(a) Any queries (extract, ID?) or (extract, ID∗) to extract oracleOextract
is not permitted to be issued by A.
A outputs i′, where i′ ∈ {0, 1} at the conclusion of this stage.
If i′ = i then A wins the game. Let AdvA=| Pr(i′ = i) − 1/2 |. If AdvA
is negligible for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A, we say that the
IBPRE+ scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure for the first level ciphertext.
Remark 2. In this security notion, we give the target identity pair (ID∗, ID?)
for our re-encryption does not randomize the second level ciphertext. From the
re-encrypted first level ciphertext, anyone can trivially derive its second level
ciphertext. So we restricted this trivial attack in our security model game.
2.1.6. Master Secret Security for IBPRE+
Pr[skID? ← Oextract(ID?),
skIDx ← Oextract(IDx)},
{RID?→IDx ← Orkextract(ID?, r, IDx)},
{RIDx→ID? ← Orkextract(IDx, r′, ID?)},
γ ← A(ID?, {IDx, skIDx},
{RID?→IDx}, {RIDx→ID?}) : γ = skID? ]
The definition on master secret security of PRE[20] by Libert and Vergnaud
is extended by us to IBPRE+, which requires that no coalition of dishonest
delegatees be able to pool their re-encryption keys in order to expose the private
key of their common delegator. The above probability should be negligible as a
function of the security parameter. λ1
1Notations: (ID?, skID? ) denotes the target user’s identity and private key, (IDx, skIDx )
denotes the colluding user’s identity and private key.
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2.2. Mathematical Tool and Assumption
In this subsection, we give the mathematical tool and assumption which are
necessary to understand our schemes.
2.2.1. Leveled Multilinear Map
Cryptographic multilinear maps are introduced by Boneh and Silverberg [7]
in 2003, which recently received great attention from cryptographic community
since Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [27] gave the plausible construction in 2013. We
define generic leveled multilinear maps following the definition of Garg, Gentry,
and Halevi [27].
Definition 1. (Leveled Multilinear Maps). Assume a group generator G exists,
which takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer k as input.
Let Ḡ = (G1, · · · ,Gk) be a sequence of groups with large prime order p ≥ 2λ. In
addition, canonical generators of Gi are gi1, gi2, · · · , gik respectively. A set of
bilinear maps {ei,j : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j |i, j ≥ 1; i+ j ≤ k} that have the following
properties exists:








where k, s, t have no explicit algebraic relationship, just for denoting the
different generators of different leveled groups.
• (Non-degenerate) We have that ei,j(gik, gjs) = gi+j|t for each valid i, j
where k, s, t have no explicit algebraic relationship, just for denoting the
different generators of different leveled groups.
If the group operations in Ḡ as well as all bilinear maps are efficiently com-
putable, we say that Ḡ is a multilinear group. We often omit the subscripts of
ei,j and just write e.
Remark 3. Although there are now many works on the insecurity of the pro-
posed levelled multilinear map [36, 37], we think it is still valuable to construct
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schemes based on multilinear map to demonstrate the novelty of some new con-
cepts, and finally guide us to some construction without multilinear map.
2.2.2. 3-linear Maps
In our scheme, we only need to use 3-leveled multilinear maps, we denote
them as 3-linear maps. The structure of our 3-linear map groups can be seen in
Fig 4. Concretely they are the following: let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups of
prime order p, and let g be a generator of G1. In addition, let ea,b : Ga ×Gb →
Ga+b(a + b ≤ 3) denote the 3-linear map. Given a security parameter 1k as
input, select a random generator g11 and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set
g13 = g
α
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Figure 4: The structure of 3-linear groups
2.2.3. D3DH Assumption
We give an assumption named Decisional 3-linear Diffie-Hellman(D3DH)
hard problem just like DBDH hard problem as following:


















11, T ) where T is randomly chosen from G3 for any algo-
rithms running in polynomial time in 3-linear map groups. Note here we denotes
e as the general 3-linear map which omits the footnote on describing the level of
map for easily understanding.
It is easy to derive the hardness of D3DH problem which is a natural exten-








11 to get e(g11, g11, g11)
abc or e(g11, g11, g11)
abd or e(g11, g11, g11)
bcd
by using 3-linear map, but it is difficult to get e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd. This is just
like in bilinear map groups, anyone can compute from ga, gb, gc to get e(g, g)ab
or e(g, g)bc or e(g, g)ac, but it is difficult to get e(g, g)abc.
3. Our Proposed IBE and IBPRE+ Schemes with Fixed Randomness
Based on 3-linear Map
In this section, we first review the BB1 IBE scheme, and then give a new IBE
scheme and a new IBE scheme with fixed randomness based on 3-linear map,
finally we give new IBPRE+ scheme with fixed randomness based on 3-linear
map.
3.1. Review of the BB1 IBE Scheme
1. SetUp(1k). Let G,GT be a bilinear group of prime order p, and the bilinear
map be e : G×G → GT . A security parameter 1k is given as input, this
algorithm select random generators g and h, g2 ∈ G. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set
g1 = g
α.
MK = α, Pub = (g, g1, g2, h)
Let Pub be the public parameters, and MK be the master secret key.
2. KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given public parameters Pub, master secret key
MK = α and an identity ID as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and outputs
an IBE secret key






3. Encrypt(ID, Pub,M). Given plaintext M ∈ GT , an identity ID and public
parameter Pub as input, select w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE ciphertext C




4. Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given public parameters Pub, an IBE ciphertext





3.2. New IBE Scheme Based on 3-linear Map
1. SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups of prime order p, and let
g be a generator of G1. In addition, denote the 3-linear map as ea,b :
Ga × Gb → Ga+b(a + b ≤ 3). Taken a security parameter 1k as input,
select random generators g11 and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set
g13 = g
α
11. Let e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) = g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let Pub be the public parameters and MK be a master secret key.
2. KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given public parameters Pub, an identity ID,
and master secret key MK = α as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and
outputs an IBE secret key as






3. Encrypt(ID, Pub,M). Given plaintext M ∈ GT , an identity ID, public
parameter Pub as input, select w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE ciphertext C







4. Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given public parameters Pub, an IBE ciphertext















3.3. New IBE Scheme with Fixed Randomness Based on 3-linear Map
1. SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups of prime order p, and let
G1’s a generator be g. In addition, let ea,b : Ga ×Gb → Ga+b(a + b ≤ 3)
denotes the 3-linear map. Given a security parameter 1k as input, select
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random generators g11 and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g13 = gα11.
Let e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) = g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let MK be a master secret key, and Pub be the public parameters.
2. KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID). Given an identity ID, master secret key MK = α
and public parameters Pub as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and outputs
an IBE secret key as






3. Encrypt(ID, Pub,M). Given plaintext M ∈ GT , an identity ID and public
parameter Pub as input, select a fixed random number r ∈ Z∗p and a
random number w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE ciphertext C
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4)






4. Decrypt(SK,Pub, C). Given an IBE ciphertext C, an IBE secret key SK

















3.4. New IBPRE+ Scheme with Fixed Randomness Scheme Based on 3-linear
Map
1. SetUp(1k). Let (G1, G2, G3) be 3-linear groups of prime order p, and let g
be a generator of G1. In addition, let the 3-linear map be ea,b : Ga×Gb →
Ga+b(a + b ≤ 3). Given a security parameter 1k as input, select random
generators g11 and h11, g12 ∈ G1. Pick α ∈ Z∗p and set g13 = gα11. Let
e11(g12, g13) = g21, e21(g21, g11) = g31.
MK = α, Pub = (g11, g12, g13, h11, g21, g31)
Let Pub be the public parameters and MK be a master secret key.
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2. KeyGen(MK,Pub, ID1). Given public parameters Pub, master secret key
MK = α and an identity ID1 as input, the PKG picks u ∈ Z∗p and output
an IBE secret key






3. Encrypt(ID1, Pub,M). Given plaintext M ∈ GT , an identity ID1 and
public parameter Pub as input, select a fixed random number r ∈ Z∗p and
a random number w ∈ Z∗p and output an IBE ciphertext C










We can see the encrypter can decrypt the ciphertext by using gr11 and









4. ReKeyGen(Pub, r, ID1, ID2). On input public parameter Pub, the en-
crypter’s fixed randomness r for ID1, the delegator’s identity ID1, del-
egatee’s identity ID2, the encrypter generates the re-encryption key as
following:




where H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a map to point hash function.
5. Reencrypt(Pub, C, rkID1→ID2 , ID1, ID2). On input the re-encryption key
and the delegator’s second level ciphertext, the proxy does the following:






4) = (C3e21(e11(C5, rk1), g13), rk2, C5, IBEID2(X))





6. Decrypt2(SKID1 , Pub, C). Given public parameters Pub, an IBE secret




, C4) = e21(e11(g12, g13)










7. Decrypt1(SKID2 , Pub, C
′). ID2 decrypt C
′
4 = IBEID2(X) to get H(x),
and compute











We first give three lemmas to prove the three schemes proposed in the above
section are IND-CPA secure, then we finally prove our IBPRE+ scheme is also
IND-CPA secure.
Lemma 1. If there exists an adversary A which can break the IND-CPA prop-
erty of the IBE encryption scheme in subsection 3.1, then we can construct an
algorithm B which can solve the DBDH hard problem.
Proof. Assume algorithm B is given the input (g, ga, gb, gc, T ), if T = e(g, g)abc,
then B outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. We say B can solve the DBDH hard
problem, if the difference between B outputs 1 and outputs 0 is non-negligible.
We show how B simulates the IBE environment for adversary A and then uses
A’s attack ability for IBE to solve the DBDH problem. B runs the IND-sID-CPA
game with A as the following:
1. Initialization. First A outputs a target identity ID∗ which he wants to
attack.
2. Setup. B first sets h = g−ID
∗
1 g
α′ ∈ G where α′ is chosen randomly from Z∗p ,
let the public parameters are (g, g1 = g
a, g2 = g
b, g3 = g




note here the master key MK = ga2 = g
ab is unknown to B.
3. Phase 1. A makes private key queries to B, the only restriction is that the
queried identities being not the ID∗. Assume the queried identity is ID,






















where rj is chosen randomly from Z
∗
p , u = rj − bID−ID∗ . It is easily to
know the returned simulated private key is indistinguishable from the real
private key.
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4. Challenge. After phase 1 is over, adversary A outputs two messages
M0,M1 ∈ G and sends them to B, B chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and
computes





,Mb · T )
If T = e(g, g)abc, then the above C is a valid challenge ciphertext, other-
wise it is an invalid challenge ciphertext.
5. Phase 2. Same as the simulation in Phase 1 with the restriction the queried
identities can not be ID∗.
6. Guess. Finally A outputs a guess b′. Algorithm B concludes its own game
by outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′ then B outputs 1 meaning
T = e(g, g)abc, otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T 6= e(g, g)abc.
When T = e(g, g)abc then A’s view is same as the real attack game. On the
other hand, when T 6= e(g, g)abc then A can only randomly guess b, and thus
Pr[b = b′] = 1/2, then the security of the scheme can be reduced to the security
of D3DH hard problem.
Lemma 2. If there exists an adversary A which can break the IND-CPA prop-
erty of the IBE encryption scheme in subsection 3.2, then we can construct
an algorithm B which can solve the Decisional 3-linear Diffie-Hellman (D3DH)
hard problem.
Proof. We can easily observe that the IBE encryption scheme in subsection 3.2
is similar as the IBE encryption scheme in subsection 3.1, with only the dif-
ference the first scheme uses 3-linear map while the latter scheme using the
bilinear map (pairing). Thus we first give an assumption named Decisional 3-
linear Diffie-Hellman hard(D3DH) problem just like DBDH problem as follow-


















11, T ) where T is randomly chosen from G. Note here we de-
notes e as the general 3-linear map which omits the footnote on describing the
level of map for easily understanding.
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Assume algorithm B is given the input (g11, ga11, gb11, gc11, gd11, T ), if T =
e(g11, g11)
abcd, then B outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. We say B can solve
the D3DH hard problem, if the difference between B outputs 1 and outputs 0
is non-negligible. We show how B simulate the IBE environment for adversary
A and then use A’s attack ability for IBE to solve the D3DH problem. B runs
the IND-sID-CPA game with A as the following:
1. Initialization. First A outputs a target identity ID∗ which he wants to
attack.




11 ∈ G where α′ is chosen randomly from
Z∗p , let the public parameters are (g11 = g11, g12 = g
b







11, g21 = e11(g12, g13) = e(g11, g11)
ab, g31 = e21(g21, g11) = e(g11, g11, g11)
ab),
note here the master key MK = ga12 = g
ab
11 is unknown to B.
3. Phase 1. A makes private key queries to B, the only restriction is that the
queried identities being not the ID∗. Assume the queried identity is ID,


























where rj is chosen randomly from Z
∗
p , u = rj − bID−ID∗ . It is easily to
know the returned simulated private key is indistinguishable from the real
private key.
4. Challenge. After phase 1 is over, adversary A outputs two messages
M0,M1 ∈ G and sends them to B, B chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and
computes







11 ,Mb · T, gd11)
If T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd, then the above C is a valid challenge ciphertext,
otherwise it is an invalid challenge ciphertext.
5. Phase 2. Same as the simulation in Phase 1 with the restriction the queried
identities can not be ID∗.
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6. Guess. Finally A outputs a guess b′. Algorithm B concludes its own game
by outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′ then B outputs 1 meaning
T = e(g, g)abc, otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T 6= e(g, g)abc.
When T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd then A’s view is same as the real attack game.
On the other hand, when T 6= e(g11, g11)abc then A can only randomly guess b,
and thus Pr[b = b′] = 1/2, then the security of the scheme can be reduced to
the security of D3DH hard problem.
Lemma 3. If there exists an adversary A which can break the IND-CPA prop-
erty of the IBE encryption scheme in subsection ??, then we can construct an
algorithm B which can solve the Decisional 3-linear Diffie-Hellman (D3DH) hard
problem.
Proof. We can easily observe that the IBE encryption scheme in subsection ??
is similar as the IBE encryption scheme in subsection 3.2, with only the differ-
ence that the former scheme uses a fixed randomness while the later scheme is
not using that. For the fixed randomness is only used in the encryption process,
thus the security proof is almost the same as the above lemma except on how
to deal with the challenge of the ciphertext.
We show how B simulates the IBE environment for adversary A and then
uses A’s attack ability for IBE to solve the D3DH problem. B runs the IND-
sID-CPA game with A as the following:
1. Initialization. Same as the above lemma.
2. Setup. Same as the above lemma.
3. Phase 1. Same as the above lemma.
4. Challenge. After phase 1 is over, adversary A outputs two messages
M0,M1 ∈ G and sends them to B, B chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and
computes







11 ,Mb · T, gd11)
where r is a randomly chosen fixed randomness from Z∗p . If T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd,
then the above C is a valid challenge ciphertext, otherwise it is an invalid
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challenge ciphertext. Note here r is used for every encryption process for
ID∗, and this does not affect the security for r which is embedded in the
exponent.
5. Phase 2. Same as the above lemma.
6. Guess. Same as the above lemma.
Thus as the above lemma, the security of the scheme can be reduced to the
security of D3DH hard problem.
Theorem 1. If there exists an adversary A which can break the IND-CPA prop-
erty of the second level ciphertexts of our IBPRE+ scheme in subsection 3.4,
then we can construct an algorithm B which can solve the Decisional 3-linear
Diffie-Hellman (D3DH) hard problem.
Proof. Assume algorithm B is given the input (g11, ga11, gb11, gc11, gd11, T ), if T =
e(g11, g11)
abcd, then B outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. We say B can solve
the D3DH hard problem, if the difference between B outputs 1 and outputs
0 is non-negligible. We show how B simulate the IBPRE+ environment for
adversary A and then use A’s attack ability for the second level ciphertexts of
IBPRE+ to solve the D3DH problem. B runs the IND-sID-CPA game with A
as the following:
1. Initialization. First A outputs a target identity ID∗ which he wants to
attack.




11 ∈ G where α′ is chosen randomly from
Z∗p , let the public parameters are (g11 = g11, g12 = g
b







11, g21 = e11(g12, g13) = e(g11, g11)
ab, g31 = e21(g21, g11) = e(g11, g11, g11)
ab),
note here the master key MK = ga12 = g
ab
11 is unknown to B.
3. Phase 1.
• A makes private key queries to B, the only restriction is that the
queried identities being not the ID∗. Assume the queried identity is
25


























where rj is chosen randomly from Z
∗
p , u = rj − bID−ID∗ . It is easily
to know the returned simulated private key is indistinguishable from
the real private key.
– Case 1: the re-encryption key query on ID → ID′ where ID, ID′ 6=
ID∗. For any other encrypter’s ciphertexts CID for ID, B does
not know the randomness in the exponent, thus B returns
rkID1→ID2 = (rk1, rk2, rk3)
= (g−r111 H(X1)
y1 , gy113 , IBEID2(X1))
where r1, y1 randomly chosen from Z
∗
p , and X1 is randomly cho-
sen from {0, 1}∗, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. This re-encryption key is
distributed same as the real re-encryption key, but it can not
re-encrypt any other encrypter’s ciphertexts correctly.
Note here one might wonder that A can distinguish the simula-
tion with the real implementation as following: A first encrypts
message m to get the ciphertexts CID for ID, and then queries
the re-encryption key on ID → ID′ and implements the re-
encryption process himself, and then query the private key of
ID′, and thus decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext CID′ and find
the message is not m, then A realize himself in the simulated
environment. We remark that this is not true, for in the real
environment, the correct re-encrypted key also can only be gen-
erated by the encrypter himself. Thus the simulated environment
is indistinguishable with the real environment for this case.
– Case 2: the re-encryption key query on ID → ID′ where ID′
is ID∗. In this case, A can not know the private key of the
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delegatee ID∗, and other discussion is the same with the above
case. Thus B can simulate the re-encryption key as the above
case.
– Case 3: the re-encryption key query on ID → ID′ where ID is
ID∗. In this case, for the ciphertexts CID∗ for ID
∗ created by B
by using the fixed randomness r, B knows the fixed randomness
and thus he can simulate the correct re-encryption key
rkID1→ID2 = (rk1, rk2, rk3)
= (g−r11 H(X2)
y2 , gy213 , IBEID2(X2))
where y2 randomly chosen from Z
∗
p , and X2 is randomly chosen
from {0, 1}∗, H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. This re-encryption key is dis-
tributed same as the real re-encryption key, and it can re-encrypt
the ciphertexts correctly. For the ciphertexts CID∗ for ID
∗ not
created by B or created by B but not using the fixed randomness
r, the simulation is same as Case 1.
4. Challenge. After phase 1 is over, adversary A outputs two messages
M0,M1 ∈ G and sends them to B, B chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly and
computes







11 ,Mb · T, gd11)
where r is a randomly chosen fixed randomness from Z∗p . If T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd,
then the above C is a valid challenge ciphertext, otherwise it is an invalid
challenge ciphertext. Note here r is used for every encryption process, and
this does not affect the security for r which is embedded in the exponent.
5. Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
6. Guess. Finally A outputs a guess b′. Algorithm B concludes its own game
by outputting a guess as follows. If b = b′ then B outputs 1 meaning T =
e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd, otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T 6= e(g11, g11, g11)abcd.
When T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd then A’s view is same as the real attack game. On
the other hand, when T 6= e(g11, g11, g11)abcd then A can only randomly guess
27
b, and thus Pr[b = b′] = 1/2, then the security of the scheme can be reduced to
the security of D3DH hard problem.
Theorem 2. If there exists an adversary A which can break the IND-CPA prop-
erty of the first level ciphertexts of our IBPRE+ scheme in subsection 3.4, then
we can construct an algorithm B which can solve the Decisional 3-linear Diffie-
Hellman (D3DH) hard problem.
Proof. The security proof for this lemma is almost same as the above lemma
except the handling on the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext
1. Initialization. Same as the above lemma.
2. Setup. Same as the above lemma.
3. Phase 1. Same as the above lemma.
4. Challenge. After phase 1 is over, adversary A outputs two messages





















11 ,Mb · T, gd11)
where r is a randomly chosen fixed randomness from Z∗p . If T = e(g11, g11, g11)
abcd,
then the above C is a valid challenge ciphertext, otherwise it is an invalid
challenge ciphertext. Note here r is used for every encryption process, and
this does not affect the security for r which is embedded in the exponent.
5. Phase 2. Same as Phase 1.
6. Guess. Same as the above lemma.
Thus as the above lemma, the security of the scheme can be reduced to the
security of D3DH hard problem.
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Theorem 3. Our IBPRE+ scheme in subsection 3.4 is master secret secure
and weak non-transferable.




we can easily see that it is independent with ID1’s private key, thus even if the
delegatee and the proxy collude, they can not derive any information on the
private key of the delegator, so our scheme can achieve master secret secure.
Furthermore, from rkID1→ID2 , skID2 , ID2 can easily produce rkID1→ID3 for
fixed randomness r, but it can not produce rkID1→ID3 for other ciphertexts not
using randomness r, thus our scheme is weak non-transferable.
5. Properties and Performance Analysis
5.1. Properties Analysis
Based on [2], our scheme has the following properties:
1. Unidirectional: the data sender S generates the re-encryption keys in our
scheme, the re-encryption key from A → B can not be used to compute
re-encryption key from B → A, so our scheme is unidirectional.
2. Non-interactive: using Bob’s public key, Alice generates the re-encryption
key; no trusted third party or interaction of Bob is required, so our scheme
is non-interactive.
3. Non-transitive: Any information about the sender’s private key cannot be
inferred from the re-encryption key by the proxy, thus the proxy cannot
re-delegate decryption rights. From rka→b and rkb→c, the proxy can not
derive rka→c, so our scheme is non-transitive.
4. Message level based delegation: in our scheme, the encrypter can eas-
ily control which message will be delegated by the proxy. For example,
for rkID1→ID2 = (g
−r
11 H(X)
y, gy13, IBEID2(X)), the message is encrypted
with randomness r if the encrypter wants to share this message with the
delegatee, otherwise the message is encrypted with other randomness. In
this way message level based delegation can be achieved.
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5. Weak non-transferability: A set of delegatees and the proxy cannot collude
to re-delegate decryption rights for the delegator. For example, although
they can produce rka→c for fixed randomness r from rka→b, skb, pkc, but
they can not produce rka→c for other ciphertexts generated by not using
randomness r. Thus the non-transferability is partially solved.
6. ReKeyGen not involving PKG: The generation of re-encryption key does
not need the PKG involving. In our scheme, the re-encryption key is gen-
erated by the encrypter by using the fixed ephemeral randomness and the
delegatee’s identity. Involving PKG in the re-encryption key generation
is not a good choice for many applications for PKG is only online in the
system initialization phase.
7. ReKeyGen involving Encrypter: The generation of re-encryption key does
need the Encrypter involving. In many cases, the encrypter decides which
message to be encrypted and thus it should have more control on the
messages compared with the decryptor. In our scheme, the re-encryption
key is generated by the encrypter by using the fixed ephemeral randomness
and the delegatee’s identity, and thus it has more power for controlling
the delegation of the message.
We compare our scheme’s properties with [31] which is a typical IBPRE scheme,
Table 1 shows comparison results, where we can see that our scheme has many
advantages compared to [31].
5.2. Performance Analysis
In this subsection, the performance of IBPRE+ scheme is analysed from the
following two aspects: the communication cost and the computation cost.
Let t3linear represent the time of one bilinear map operation in 3 linear group
(e,G1, G2, G3, Z
∗
p ), texp1, texp2 and texp3 represents the exponential operation of
the group G1, G2, G3, the elements length of group G1 is |G1| bits, the elements
length of group G2 is |G2| bits, the elements length of group G3 is |G3| bits, the
elements length of group Z∗p is |Z∗p | bits.
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Table 1: Feature comparison





Message-level based delegation Yes No
ReKeyGen Involving PKG No Yes
ReKeyGen Involving Encrypter Yes No
Table 2: Communication cost
Scheme Our Scheme [31]
Public Parameter 4|G1|+|G2|+|G3| 5|H1|+2|H2|+|Z∗p′ |
Private Key 2|G1| 2|H1|
Re-encryption Key 6|G1|+|G3| 2|H1|
Original Ciphertext 4|G1|+|G3| 3|H1|+|H2|
Re-encrypted Ciphertext 6|G1|+2|G3| 2|H1|+|H2|
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Let Tbilinear represents the time of one bilinear map operation in bilinear
group (e,H1, H2, Z
∗
p′), Texp1, Texp2 represents the exponential operation of the
group H1, H2, the elements length of group H1 is |H1| bits, the elements length
of group H2 is |H2| bits, the elements length of group H3 is |H3| bits, the
elements length of group Z∗p′ is |Z∗p′ | bits.
Table 2 shows the comparison results about communication complexity be-
tween the scheme of [31] and our scheme, Table 3 shows the comparison results
about computation cost between the scheme of [31] and our scheme.
Please note here that a very rough comparison on the number of group el-
ements or the operation of group elements is done; actually our scheme is a
theoretical construction due to the current research status of multilinear map.
However, we stress here that our scheme is the first identity based proxy re-
encryption scheme which can support message-level based fine-grained delega-
tion for the data owner and can easily achieve weak non-transferable property.
It is a novel cryptographic primitive which may find other interesting applica-
tions. Furthermore, we think it is very probable to find new construction of
IBPRE+ without multilinear map, which we leave as future work.
We do not implement our IBPRE+ scheme in this paper for the research
on multilinear map including 3-linear map is very active and unstable. Many
candidate constructions have been broken, but until now many cryptographic
researchers still are optimistic on the final construction of 3-linear map and even
multilinear map [8].
6. IBPRE+ for Secure Social Cloud Data Sharing
Here, we demonstrate the application of our scheme in the social cloud stor-
age access control system. As shown in Fig. 5, the main actors of our system
are the data owner, many data users, a System Management Server (SMS) and
a number of cloud storage servers (Cloud Storage Server, CSS). For a particu-
lar user, if she is the owner of a certain data, we call her as the Data Owner
(DO), the rest of the data users may share the data, then they are called Data
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Table 3: Computation cost
Schemes Our Scheme [31]
KeyGen 4texp1 3Texp1
Encrypt 4texp1 + texp3 Tbilinear + 3Texp1 + Texp2
ReKeyGen 5texp1 3Texp1
Reencrypt 2t3linear 2Tbilinear + Texp2
Decrypt1 3t3linear 2Tbilinear + Texp2
Decrypt2 t3linear 2Tbilinear + Texp2
Sharer (DS). The data owner encrypts her data contents like his social photos’
encapsulation key (the social photos are directly encrypted by ciphers suitable
for JPEG or video encryption using this key) and then outsource them to the
cloud storage servers. Later she wants to share the social photos with other
friends. The System Management Server mainly stores some public informa-
tion for the users to grant access control, such as the system’s parameters, the
users’ public key information, re-encryption keys and so on. The Cloud storage
server effectively and safely store users’ sensitive data, ensuring the robustness
and integrity of the stored data. As a service, the Quality of Service is also an
important basis for the user to choose the providers of cloud storage service,
therefore, the robustness and the confidentiality of data should be ensured. In
this paper, it is assumed that the cloud storage server is semi-trusted, and it
will respond and give the correct answer for the user’s legitimate request; at the
same time, it would be interested in the encrypted data content and attempt to
gain the knowledge of the underline plaintexts.
Concretely, system initialization, key generation, data storage, data sharing
and data recovery consist the algorithms of our IBPRE+ for secure social cloud
data sharing framework:
1. System initialization. First a security parameter is selected by the PKG.
The PKG generates some public parameters on inputting this security
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parameter. The public parameters are then outsourced to the system
management server and made to be publicly to anyone.
2. Key generation. By using the system parameters, user’s identity and mas-
ter secret key, the PKG generates the private key of the system users.
Then by using a secure channel, the private key is sent to the users by the
PKG.
3. Data storage. When outsourcing her private social photos to the cloud,
data owner Alice first selects cipher suitable for photo encryption and then
encrypts the social photos with this cipher. Then by using our IBPRE+
scheme with some fixed randomness, she encrypts the cipher’s key for
photos A1, A2, · · · , An, she also encrypts the cipher’s key for photos B1,
B2, · · · , Bn with some other fixed randomness. Finally all the ciphertexts
are outsourced to the cloud storage server. Of course the outsource data’s
integrity will be ensured by other cryptographic techniques like provable
data position. Note here when Alice does not want to share her personal
photo C with Bob or Charlie, she can simply encrypt the cipher’s key with
other randomness. In this way, Alice can completely control which photo
will be shared with Bob, which photo will be shared with Charlie, which
photo will be not shared with Bob or Charlie either.
4. Data sharing with Bob. With her close friend Bob when Alice wants to
share her personal photo A1, she generates the re-encryption keys for
Bob. The key is generated by using public parameters, Bob’s identity and
the fixed randomness for photo A1 and sent to the cloud. Alice’s out-
sourced encrypted photo A1 is first retrieved by the cloud storage server,
then it implements the re-encryption algorithm and send the re-encrypted
ciphertext to Bob.
5. Data sharing with Charlie. When sharing her personal photo B1 with an-
other close friend Charlie, data owner Alice first generates the re-encryption
key for Charlie. This key is generated by using public parameters, Char-
lie’s identity and the fixed randomness for photo B and sent to the cloud.
Then Alice’s outsourced encrypted photo B1 is first retrieved by the cloud
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storage servers, and the re-encryption algorithm is implemented, then the
re-encrypted ciphertext is sent to Charlie.
6. Data recovery. By using his own private key, after getting the re-encrypted
ciphertexts data sharer Bob decrypts encrypted photo A1, and he will get
the cipher key for social photo A1. Then he requires the cloud also send
him the encrypted social photo A1, he can decrypt them by using the
retrieved cipher key to get the social photo. By implementing the similar
process, data sharer Charlie can retrieve photo B1.
We describe our framework in the following algorithm 1:
By using the traditional identity based proxy re-encryption, Alice also can
share her private social photos with Bob. But she cannot achieve the message-
level fine-grained access control on her photos. Such as, if she wants to share
with Bob only the photo A but not photo B, IBPRE cannot easily achieve this
property, but IBPRE+ can achieve this easily by controlling the randomness
used in the encryption process.
Furthermore, by using IBPRE, Bob and cloud can easily collude to re-assign
re-encryption ability to the proxy for sharing photos with Charlie. But IBPRE+
can prevent this for even if Bob and the cloud collude, they can not derive new
re-encryption keys from Alice to Charlie. Someone may argue that, as Bob can
share Alice’s private photos, he of course has the ability to share these photos
with Charlie. This is true, but note that this sharing process is offline and Bob
can be easily caught for high bandwidth or direct communication between Bob
and Charlie. While sharing through proxy re-encryption, Bob needs only collude
with the cloud to generate new re-encryption keys, which is much smaller than
the social photos, and can be caught only with very little probability.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we further extend the concept of PRE+ to the identity based
setting. We propose a new primitive IBPRE+ and give a concrete construction.
IBPRE+ can be seen as the dual of the traditional IBPRE scheme. We prove the
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm of IBPRE+ for Secure Social Cloud
Data Sharing
1 System initialization: PKG(1k)→ Pub, Pub→ SMS, let Pub be public;
2 Key generation:
3 for i = 1 to t do
4 PKG runs KeyGen(IDi,MK,Pub)→ SKIDi , distribute SKIDi to IDi;
5 Data storage:
6 Alice first encrypts the social photos with ciphers suitable for JPEG
encryption; then she encrypts the cipher’s key with our IBPRE+ scheme with
some fixed randomness for photos A1, A2, · · · , An;
7 for i = 0 to n do
8 calculate CipherK(Ai)→ DEM ;
9 Encrypt(Pub, r,K)→ KEM where r is the fixed randomness;
10 for i = 0 to n do
11 calculate CipherK′(Bi)→ DEM ;
12 Encrypt(Pub, r′,K′)→ KEM where r′ is the fixed randomness;
13 Data sharing photo A1:
14 Alice she first generates the re-encryption keys for Bob;
15 ReKeyGen(Pub, r, Alice,Bob)→ rkA→B ;
16 Cloud Server implements the re-encryption algorithm;
17 Reencrypt(Pub,KEM, rkA→B , Alice,Bob)→ C′, C′ → Bob;
18 Data sharing photo B1:
19 Alice she first generates the re-encryption keys for Charlie;
20 ReKeyGen(Pub, r, Alice, Charlie)→ rkA→C ;
21 Cloud Server implements the re-encryption algorithm;






24 Bob decrypt encrypted photo A1 by using his own private key;
25 Decrypt1(SKBob, Pub, C
′)→ K, DeCipherK(DEM) = A1.
26 Charlie decrypt encrypted photo B1 by using his own private key;
27 Decrypt1(SKCharlie, Pub, C
′′
























Figure 5: IBPRE+ for secure cloud data sharing
security of the construction by using standard cryptographic techniques. Many
interesting directions can be explored, such as giving more efficient construction
of IBPRE+ scheme, finding more application of IBPRE+, etc.
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